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THE HISTORICAL MOMENT I would like
to revisit here is the curious and historically
notorious ‘banishment’ of the fool Hanswurst
from the German theatre that was publicly
staged outside the gates of Leipzig in 1737 by
Karoline Friederike Neuber’s acting troupe.
The Neuber acting troup were collaborating
with the professor of logic, metaphysics and
poetics Johann Christoph Gottsched, who
regarded the theatre as a good vehicle for the
dissemination of moral reason because, as he
argued, examples ‘make a stronger impres-
sion into the heart’ than logical reasoning.1
When Gottsched directed his attention to the
German theatre of his time, however, he saw
a theatre dominated by the ‘disorderly’
‘Haupt- und Staatsaktionen’ (chief and state
actions), which consisted of adaptations of
foreign and German baroque dramas, French
and Spanish tragicomedies, as well as Italian
opera libretti.2
Gottsched objected not only to the fact
that these plays did not adhere to the unities
of time, place, and action, or to probability
and the ‘imitation of nature’. In his theo-
retical writings on the theatre, as well as in
his moral weeklies, Die Vernünftigen Tadler-
innen and Der Biedermann, he criticized most
of all the integral role played by the comic
figure who under various names – Hans-
wurst, Harlekin, Pickelhering, et al.3 – dis-
rupted the ‘Haupt- und Staatsaktionen’ with
his crude jokes and mockery of the aristo-
cratic ideal heroes.
The Neubers for their part were driven in
equal measure by their own reforming ideals
and by the need to survive the tough com-
petition in a landscape of travelling theatre
troupes. Karoline Neuber was not without
ulterior motives when she joined Gottsched
in the fight against a stage dominated by
Harlequin and Hanswurst: her strongest
competitor in the struggle for performing
privileges was Joseph Ferdinand Müller, a
famous Hanswurst performer. The united
campaign against the comic fool reached its
culmination in the symbolic ‘banishment’ or
expulsion of 1737, which took the form of a
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special prologue written by Karoline Neuber
entitled ‘The Victory of Reason or the Death
of Hanswurst’ (‘Der Sieg der Vernunft – oder
der Tod des Hans Wurst’).4
Despite the fact that actors kept on per-
forming as Hanswurst, Harlekin, Bernadon,
and Kasperl throughout the eighteenth cen-
tury, especially in the southern, predomin-
antly Catholic parts of Germany and most of
all in Vienna,5 and although the playwright
and dramaturg Gottholt Ephraim Lessing
later ridiculed Neuber’s and Gottsched’s
Hanswurst-banishment as ‘the biggest harle-
quinade of all’ (‘die größte Harlekinade’) ’6 this
staged banishment has generally been re-
garded as an emblematic moment in German
theatre history for the transition from popu-
lar, improvised, so-called ‘Stegreiftheater’ to a
modern bourgeois literary mode. 
This paved the way for further debate
about the legitimacy of the comic figure and
for further theatre censorship throughout the
Enlightenment. In Austria this took the form
of a ‘Hanswurst Streit’ (1747–69) and compre-
hensive state censorship under the absolutist
monarchy of Maria Theresia and Joseph II.7
However, even though the censorship of
Hanswurst performers often focused on their
dangerous habit of ‘extemporizing’, there are
indications that it marks an even more pro-
found epistemological break than the shift
from improvised to text-based theatre, in-
volving changes in what and how theatre
signified. 
A Bourgeois Need for Self-Representation
In this article I propose to read the Hans-
wurst banishment as part of the larger his-
torical relationship between discourses on
acting and the emergence of a modern self in
the Enlightenment. My main thesis with res-
pect to this relationship is that the so-called
‘natural’ acting style developed by theatre
reformers from around the middle of the eigh-
teenth century is a response to an increasing
need for self-representation, which turns the stage
into an aesthetic mirror for the bourgeois
individual. 
This can be approached with the help of
Lacanian and post-Lacanian psychoanalytical
theories of subject formation. Lacan’s theory
of the mirror phase is highly pertinent here,
as it not only shows how the child at a certain
age first constitutes itself as a subject through
its (mis-)recognition in the mirror, but also
argues that this first identification with an
external image or ‘imago’ sets the self on a
track for future secondary identifications in
the search of an Ideal-I, that it ‘situates the
ego, before its social determination, in a fic-
tional direction.’8 The subject’s (fictional)
sense of cohesion and autonomy is given to it
by the fact that in the mirror image the body
appears in a sculptural perfection, as a
‘Gestalt’ that contrasts with its own sense of
fragmentation. 
Julia Kristeva’s theoretical contribution is
to have argued that the child’s identification
in the mirror goes hand in hand with – or is
actually preceded by – a rejection and repres-
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Anton Stranitzky as Hanswurst. Eighteenth-century
etching, Wiener Stadt- und Landesbibliothek
(Sammlung Fritz Bruckner).
sion of bodily matters and energies that
threaten the constitution of an Ideal-I and the
sense of a closed-off, separate self: ‘Even
before being like, “I” am not but do separate,
reject, ab-ject. Abjection with a meaning
broadened to take in a subjective diachrony,
is a precondition of narcissism.’9
As I have already discussed elsewhere
with respect to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s
Hamburg Dramaturgy, Jacques Lacan can help
us theorize the bourgeois desire for self-
recognition in the visual Gestalt of the tamed
and disciplined actor, while Julia Kristeva’s
concept of abjection can help us explain the
censoring reactions to physically transgres-
sive forms of performing and ultimately to
the very threat of performance as such.10
Arguably Lacan and Kristeva both assert that
psychic processes of subject formation and
abjection are universal individual phenomena,
but Kristeva does indicate that
socio-historical considerations can be brought in
at a second stage. They will allow us to under-
stand why that demarcating imperative, which is
subsequently experienced as abjection, varies
according to time and space, even though it is
universal.11
And elsewhere she acknowledges – as if
historically qualifying this universalism – that
‘the transition from the baroque man, who
had neither interior nor exterior, to the psy-
chological man of the romantics . . . occurred
during the eighteenth century’.12
Taking this as an invitation to historicize
psychological subject formation, the ques-
tions I would, therefore, like to ask of the
Hanswurst-banishment are: what kind of
figure, what kind of acting and along with it
what kind of body was symbolically expelled
from the stage by expelling Hanswurst?
What was at stake in this banishment psycho-
socially, politically, and aesthetically?
Hanswurst and the Civilizing Process
For good reasons, some commentators have
read the banishment of Hanswurst in terms
of Norbert Elias’s ‘civilizing process’ and its
problem with the carnivalesque plebeian
body: for if we compare Hanswurst’s main
characteristics and typical actions on stage
with Gottsched’s values and ideals of a vir-
tuous and dutiful human being, the comic-
ally stark contrast is that between a vulgar,
base, and ‘uncivilized’ peasant, on the one
hand, and a reasoned, restrained, and ‘civil-
ized’ bourgeois citizen, on the other. 
Accordingly, in another prologue play by
Karoline Neuber, Der alte und der neue Ge-
schmack (1738), the ‘old taste’ is personified
by a peasant (Bauer) while the ‘new taste’ is
a ‘junger wohlerzogener Mensch’ (‘young, well-
mannered man’).13 Thus Hanswurst – in his
original conception a ‘Sauschneider’ (pig but-
cher) by profession but in later plays often a
peasant-like servant figure – always has an
enormous voracity for food and drink, which
is already indicated by his name (‘Pickel-
hering’ and ‘Jean Potage’ suggest similar
characteristics but are not as gluttonous as
Hanswurst). He eats and drinks himself
through enormous portions and grotesquely
long lists of food and booze and generally
has nothing else on his mind. As Müller-
Kampel analyzes this ‘Freßsack and Säufer’
(glutton and drunkard): 
Whether love intrigues are spun around him,
whether battles are being fought and corpses
having to be collected, or whether he only has to
stand guard or deliver a letter, like will-o’-the
wisps images of devouring or carousing are
perpetually arising in him.14
By contrast, the readers of Gottsched’s Welt-
weisheit are admonished to exercise moder-
ation and self-restraint in their diet: ‘one has
to make oneself the master over one’s senses
and either break oneself of the habit of such
unhealthy things altogether or stop with
the foods and beverages when they taste
best’15 – an idea that would never occur to
Hanswurst.
Similarly, while Gottsched in his Welt-
weisheit preaches a Protestant work ethic of
diligence and moderation in expenditure,16
Hanswurst has a thoroughly materialistic
Weltanschauung and is willing do anything
for money except work.17 He is happy to lie,
thieve, act as a hired killer, or marry someone
rich but old and ugly. Only being a fool is for
free, Hanswurst affirms in Stranitzky’s Scipio,
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for everything else he requires money.18 This
includes even his own excrement: ‘Money
and faeces are the equivalents in which
Hanswurst deals,’ as Gerhard Scheit notes.
‘The jester wants money for everything and
he gives for everything his excrement. For
borrowed money he offers the usurer “two
pounds from my body . . . as soon as I’ve had
a good meal”.’19
Finally, Hanswurst also exhibits a perma-
nent lust for sexual adventures – his name
and the essential prop of a wooden sword
also bearing obvious phallic connotations (as
the contemporary etching alongside demon-
strates in a scarcely veiled manner). 
Mein Lust besteht in Würst, die groß und völlig
seyn;
Wer mir sie nehmen will, der muß sich mit mir
schmeissen:
Ich ließ mir eh den Kopf, als meine Würst
wegreissen.
Ein jeder Würst-Hanß stimt auch dißfalls mit mir
ein.
[My pleasure consists in sausages that are big
and full; whoever wants to take them from me
has to fight with me. I’d rather have my head
torn off than my sausage. Every Wurst-hans
also agrees with me in this.]
Being a notorious ‘collector of women and
sexual dreamer’, Hanswurst’s pet names for
his lovers (he calls them ‘Menschern’) reveal,
as Müller-Kampel explains:
his view of sexuality as a mutual use of genitalia,
which he in turn reifyingly conflates with the im-
bibing of food and drink, the use of everyday
tools, the operation of war weaponry, or the copu-
lation of animals.
For example: ‘my butterbarrel’, ‘you chosen
inkwell of my quill’, or ‘yonder target at
which I have already shot most of my
powder’.20 Many plots thus revolve around
Hanswurst chasing women or conversely
finding himself being chased by women.
Needless to say, such sexual appetite runs
counter to Gottsched’s view that a virtuous
person should regard intercourse solely as a
means for procreation and refrain from it
otherwise.21
Not surprisingly Gottsched at the end of
this last section advises the person striving
for chastity that he avoid ‘places where
sensual pleasure is aroused, such as opera
theatres and dishonourable comedies, in
which romantic escapades, dirty jokes, and
fooleries are the best adornment’ (‘Er
vermeide ferner die Oerter, wo man zur Wollust
gereizet wird, als Opernbühnen und unehrbare
Komödien, darinnen verliebte Romanstreiche,
Zoten, und Narretheidungen der beste Zierrath
sind’).22 Gottsched obviously saw the stage
as providing direct models or sensual
enticement for the spectator’s behaviour –
the dilemma being, as we have seen above,
that he wanted to use the theatre as a didactic
vehicle precisely because it was a medium
appealing to the senses. Consequently, cen-
soring and controlling the action or the
figures on stage for Gottsched was synony-
mous with educating and restraining people
in the audience.
While Hanswurst apparently gives free
reign to his drives, the tenor of Gottsched’s
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A priapic Wursthans. Seventeenth/eighteenth-century
etching, Germanisches Nationalmuseum Nürnberg.
‘practical’ Weltweisheit and by extension of
his theatre reforms is the neccessary control
of one’s affects. As we ‘cannot root out the
passions altogether’, Gottsched says, ‘it is
therefore enough that we learn to bring them
under the obedience of reason’ (‘Es ist also
genug, daß wir [die Leidenschaften] unter den
Gehorsam der Vernunft bringen’).23 ‘Vernunft’
here serves the function of the superego – be
it as the moral agent for the individual or as
the three unities and various other rules for
the composition and performance of a play
(these ‘new’ regular plays were often referred
to by Gottsched and Neuber as ‘vernünftige
Stücke’, or ‘reasonable plays’). 
In light of this it makes sense to read the
Hanswurst figure as a victim of the ‘civiliz-
ing process’, whose long-term influence in
changing social structures towards a higher
level of differentiation and integration in
modernity, according to Elias, exact the price
of people’s increasing and differentiating
control of affects and the gradual formation
of a strong superego.24 This also seems to be
the object of Gottsched’s reform of comedy. 
In his Critische Dichtkunst he constrasts the
‘old comedy’ of the ancient Greeks, which he
describes as belonging to peasant culture –
’comedy’, as he points out, meaning ‘village
song’25 – with the ‘new comedy’ of Terence,
which was ‘regular’ and imitated nature with-
out resorting to comic figures such as Hans-
wurst or Harlekin who have ‘no example in
nature’.26 Gottsched summarizes the ideal
comedy as follows: 
Die Comödie ist nichts anders, als eine Nachahmung
einer lasterhaften Handlung, die durch ihr lächerliches
Wesen den Zuschauer belustigen, aber auch zugleich
erbauen kann. (p. 348)
[Comedy is nothing but an imitation of a wicked
action, which through its ridiculousness can amuse
but at the same time edify the spectator.]
In other words, the spectator should no
longer laugh with a comic figure but about the
wicked action of a person, while at the same
time applying this laughter to himself. Sup-
porting the formation of a strong superego,
his gaze should turn in on itself. This reform
demanded an identity of the subject and
object of comedy which Hanswurst or Harle-
quin as generic comic figures could not pro-
vide (as I will discuss below).
Unlike Gottsched’s reform of comedy,
which ultimately left no place for the comic
figure, Neuber’s reforming ideas at the time
of the Deutsches Vorspiel still included the
Harlekin figure, whom she wanted to con-
vert for didactic purposes.27 This project,
however, would amount to a taming and
disciplining of the comic figure, as was
indeed witnessed in Neuber’s later plays. As
Lessing later criticized, the reformers 
hatten nur das bunte Jäckchen und den Namen
abgeschafft, aber den Narren behalten. Die Neuberin
selbst spielte eine Menge Stücke, in welchen Harlekin
die Hauptperson war. Aber Harlekin hieß bei ihr Häns-
chen und war ganz weiß anstatt scheckicht gekleidet. 
[The reformers had only got rid of the colourful jac-
ket and the name, but kept the fool. The Neuberin
herself put on many plays in which Harlequin
was the main figure. But Harlequin with her was
called Little Hans and was dressed all in white
instead of speckled colours.] 
Even though Lessing here as elsewhere mocks
Neuber’s and Gottsched’s ‘banishment’ of
the comic figure, his own dramaturgy argu-
ably still profited from it. For not only was
Hanswurst turned into the harmless diminu-
tive of Hänschen (after he had already been
replaced by the more ‘civilized’, i.e. ‘frenchi-
fied’, Harlekin), but the comic figure itself
was also separated out from the main action
in the form of Hanswurstiaden or Harlequin
pantomimes (i.e., plays in which Hanswursts
or Harlequins were the main figures). These
comic mini-plays were then relegated to the
position of pre- or after-play entertainments
and merely framed the main ‘serious’ drama
of the evening. 
Lessing’s Hamburger Dramaturgie reflects
this new high/low division only in as much
as these Hanswurstiaden and Harlequin panto-
mimes, like ballets and other ‘side shows’,
are hardly ever mentioned in his comments
on an evening at the theatre.28 Lessing’s and
Mylius’s own early theatre journalism had
actually programmatically brought about
such a cultural marginalization of popular
theatre by excluding it from critical reflec-
tion. Thus they state at the beginning of their
Beyträge zur Historie und Aufnahme des Theaters
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(Contributions to the History and Acceptance
of the Theatre, 1750): 
Alle diejenigen Schaubühnen werden also außer der
Sphäre unsrer Betrachtungen seyn, auf welchen sich
nicht anders, als von ohngefähr, ein gutes Schauspiel
sehen läßt, auf welchen das Geschrey des Hanswursts
und seiner Cameraden die Vernunft und den guten
Geschmack übertäubet und die Dummheit entzücket;
auf welchen die curieusen, extragalanten Haupt- und
Staats- und Heldenactionen das Bürgerrecht noch
haben, und kurz, welche Verstand und Sitten
verderben.29
[All those stages will remain outside the sphere of
our considerations on which one can see a good
play only by chance, on which the screaming of
Hanswurst and his mates drowns out reason and
good taste and delights stupidity; on which the
curious and extra-gallant chief- and state- and
heroic actions still have civil rights, and in short
which corrupt mind and morals.]
Hanswurst within a Baroque Episteme
The contrast in Lessing’s description between
the screaming Hanswurst and the (extra)
gallant heroic actions makes us realize that
the Hanswurst figure ultimately cannot be
viewed in isolation if we want to understand
its role in the civilizing process and its shift-
ing epistemes. Rather, we have to backtrack a
little and look at the whole constellation of
artistocratic hero, opponent, and comic
figure within the Haupt- und Staatsaktionen
(chief and state actions) of seventeenth-
century touring companies. As Erika Fischer-
Lichte has shown, this constellation and the
semiotics of German baroque acting practices,
too, could be read within the context of the
civilizing process,30 since they embody new
social requirements brought on by the trans-
formation from a warrior class to a courtly
nobility at the beginning of the seventeenth
century, which Elias summarizes as follows:
Deliberation, calculation over long periods, self-
control, precise regulation of one’s own affects,
and knowledge of people and the whole terrain
become essential prerequisites for every social
success.31
Accordingly, the heroic ego in these baroque
plays of labyrinthine intrigue and changing
fortune had to prove itself by resisting the
onslaught of affects. 
The disciplined art of acting which corres-
ponds to this aim is elaborated in instruc-
tional texts as late as Franciscus Lang’s
Dissertatio de Actione Scenica (1727). As here
illustrated, the actor is taught to assume the
basic posture, the so-called ‘crux scenica’, in
which the feet were placed at a ninety-degree
angle, while performing strictly prescribed
physical representations of the emotions.32
By thus controlling his body according to the
rules, the hero proves that he is also in
control of the affects that storm in on him.
His opponent, on the other hand, often a
tyrant or a madman,
is characterized by being unable to follow the rules:
he runs across the stage, hits his head against the
wall so that blood is squirting out, rolls around on
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the floor, and thus manifestly proves to the specta-
tor that he is helplessly at the mercy of the affects.33
The comic figure – Pickelhering, Hanswurst,
or Harlequin – similarly violates all the rules
of this highly regimented acting: rather than
keeping his body taut and controlled, he
bends his knees and upper body, shows his
naked behind, and gestures obscenely below
the waist. But instead of being determined
by affects he is ruled by bodily materialism.
Instead of proving himself through changing
fortune like the heroic martyr, he adapts to
every change, thinking only of his stomach,
never about the salvation of his soul.34
His reversals and transgressions were not
necessarily a threat to aristocratic authority.
Within a baroque world view, he was funny
not because he ‘subverted’ the power of the
heroes but because he revealed his own
peasant ignorance of courtly ideals.35 Rather,
as Fischer-Lichte has argued with reference
to Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of carnival,
within the episteme of baroque theatre the
Hanswurst figure had an important compen-
sating function in the civilizing process:
He oppose[d] the controllable and controlled
body of the hero with the grotesque body of
carnival, [bringing] the excluded back into the
frame of society. In doing so [the comic figure]
took on a relieving function for those spectators
who were not yet up to the pressures of the
civilizing process and the demands of the new
behavioural ideals.36
What is not entirely convincing about this
argument is that early eighteenth-century
reformers simply ‘thought the compensatory
function of the fool to be outmoded and
obsolete’.37 This cannot account for all their
motivations, and even less for their fervour
in banishing him, which I shall now address. 
I take my cue from a Hanswurst prologue
published in 1816, which is itself part of a
nineteenth-century, counter-Enlightenment
nostalgia for the fool and which bemoans the
demise of Hanswurst and the fact that he is
now mostly known as a puppet-play effigy
for children. Commenting on the audience’s
pleasure which has since supplanted the
enjoyment of watching a Hanswurst perfor-
mance, the Hanswurst prologue says:
Doch will ich bey Leib damit nicht meinen,
Daß außer mir keine Lust kann erscheinen:
Sie seh’n auf den Brettern immer nur sich
Und wer ist spaßiger als der Herr Ich?38
[Yet by no means do I want to say here
That no pleasure but me can appear;
It is always themselves who on stage they see
And who could be funnier than Mr Me?]
What follows is a long list of scenes the
spectators might see, a kind of parodic index
to the now dominant repertoire of bourgeois
comedy and sentimental family melodrama.
From Osmotic to Closed Body, Stage, Self
Even though the representation of the bour-
geois world and bourgeois heroes in comedy
and tragedy was still a far cry for Gottsched
and Neuber, because tragedy was reserved
for aristocratic heroes, I would maintain that
they were already carving out a space for the
bourgeois subject. Thus Gottsched not only
wants tragedy to hold a critical mirror up to
aristocratic rulers – to ‘teach you, the gods of
this earth, that you, too, are humans’39 – but
conversely also paves the way for bourgeois
tragedy by asking, ‘Can’t a noble man and
citizen practise on a small scale what princes
and heroes have done on a large scale?’40
Gottsched signalled a move from the virtu-
ous nobleman to the ‘noble citizen’ by insinu-
ating that the ideals inscribed in baroque
tragedy – virtue and gallant self-control – are
transferrable to the emerging bourgeoisie.
Hanswurst is an obstacle to this project of
‘seeing Herr Ich’ on stage not only because of
what he represents but also because of what
and how he communicates in the theatre.
First of all, he is not a suitable object for
identification because he is essentially a
mask. ‘He behaves himself like no human
being amongst ourselves behaves himself’
was a contemporary objection Lessing cites,
and ‘it is nonsensical to see the same
individual appear in a different play every
day’. To which Lessing insightfully responds:
‘So he doesn’t have to announce who he is. . . .
One has to see him not as an individual but
rather as a whole genre.’41
Lessing himself was quite prepared to
tolerate this ‘genre’ at the fringes, but at the
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same time he began to demand of tragedy
that it should have heroes ‘of the same
substance’ (‘vom selben Schrot und Korn’) as
‘us’ – that is, the bourgeois spectators.42 How-
ever, such an aesthetic identification with indi-
vidual heroes on stage required an aesthetic
distance and a mirror ‘plane’, a ‘fourth wall’
between stage and auditorium. In other
words, I argue that the emerging fourth wall
served the same function as the mirror’s
surface in Lacan’s model: without it, the illu-
sion necessary for subject formation through
the aesthetics of sympathy (Mitleidsästhetik)
developed by Lessing could not have worked.
Similarly, the actor’s corporeality would have
to be moulded into an individual, closed-off
Gestalt the spectator could identify with. The
fool, by contrast, represented an ‘osmotic’
relationship between stage and auditorium;
his was a dangerously ‘osmotic’ body which
threatened subject formation and therefore
had to be ‘abjected’. 
What causes abjection, according to
Kristeva, is ‘what disturbs identity, system,
order. What does not respect borders, posi-
tions, rules’.43 Stranitzky’s Hanswurst and
Kurz’s Bernardon, as Müller-Kampel has
analyzed, represent a
baroque body without a self – which is in a double
sense a ‘character-less’ and ‘unreasonable’ body
whose parts and functions do not obey their
bearer, lead their own lives, and often enough get
into conflict with one another.44
It is, moreover, associated with the kind of
quintessentially ‘open’ body that Bakhtin has
identified as the grotesque body of carnival: 
The distinctive character of this body is its open
unfinished nature, its interaction with the world.
These traits are most fully and concretely revealed
in the act of eating; the body transgresses here its
own limits: it swallows, devours, rends the world
apart, is enriched and grows at the world’s
expense.45
It is also easy to see that Hanswurst does not
adhere to the division between stage and
auditorium: dramaturgically he is often posi-
tioned at the threshold between specators
and performance space, continually destroy-
ing any illusion by extemporizing and
addressing himself directly to to the audi-
ence. His asides frequently break through
the reality of the stage action and point to its
theatricality: everything to him is play. While
this did not constitute a problem within
baroque theatre, it did become a problem for
an emerging bourgeois audience who wanted
to see their world mirrored on stage. 
Furthermore, the fool is not only posi-
tioned right at the threshold between stage
and auditorium but, as a carnivalesque figure,
also ‘belongs to the borderline between art
and life’, as Mikhail Bakhtin has stated.46 In a
situation where the theatre is not yet firmly
institutionalized but still part of the
marketplace, the comic performer is not
limited to the one theatrical site and is
therefore capable of forming strong associa-
tive links with other popular forms of enter-
tainment and popular (pre-modern) beliefs
and practices. Without making a distinction
between actor and character, Gottsched’s
moral weekly Der Biedermann thus talks of
a lewd Hans Wurst who travels around from vil-
lage to village with quacks, jugglers, marionettes,
and cheapjacks. Everybody knows that these kind
of people seek their sagacity in obscenities and
their wit in a more than peasanty lewdness. These
people I do not like to defend: rather I detest
everything dishonourable and disgraceful they
tend to produce.47
Related to this is my point about Hanswurst
as ‘osmotic body’ – someone who embodied
and was associated with a pre-modern con-
ception of the body. 
The Pre-Modern Perception of the Body
My reading here was originally inspired by
Barbara Duden’s work on body perceptions
in the seventeenth and early eighteenth
century. She states that: ‘The society of the
seventeenth century did not yet have room
for a corporeality that was isolated, “disem-
bedded” from the total network of social
relations.’48 With reference to contemporary
descriptions of the plague, Duden notes that
a ‘constant exchange took place between the
inside and the outside, a relation of osmotic
exchanges with the elements’.49 Looking at
the narratives of medical patients in the early
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eighteenth century, she observes that the body
was perceived to be vulnerable to vapours,
‘impressions, delusions, and imagined things
[as] the prime causes of illness’.50
In this cosmos the skin does not close off the body,
the inside, against the outside world. In like man-
ner the body itself is also never closed off.51
The bodies of actors and spectators in the
theatre were no exception to such perme-
ability. On the contrary, as Joseph Roach
explains in a study that links theories of
acting to the history of science, seventeenth-
century actors and acting have to be under-
stood in terms of the rhetoric of passions
derived from Quintilian. Drawing on ancient
physiological doctrines such as pneumatism,
this rhetoric defined the actor’s ‘imperson-
ations as a mode of inspiration’, whereby
‘inspiration’ was understood literally as a
kind of breathing-into-the-body: 
The inspiring forces came literally out of thin air.
A vital pneuma, imbibed from a universal aether,
supposedly permeated the blood as spirits, and,
radiating outward from the heart and lungs, dis-
played inward feelings as outward motions. This
magical aether was neither fire nor water, air nor
earth, but a fifth essence more subtle than any
substance. The word emotion itself derives from
the Latin emovere (to move out, to stir up), which
assumed the existence of a vital spirit, constantly
active and motive, suffused throughout the human
frame.52
The actor who could call upon such ‘inspir-
ation’ with his imagination was in a position
that was especially privileged and at the same
time dangerous : 
The rhetoric of the passions that derived from pneu-
matism endowed the actor’s art with three poten-
cies of an enchanted kind. First, the actor possessed
the power to act on his own body. Second, he
possessed the power to act on the physical space
around him. Finally, he was able to act on the
bodies of the spectators who shared that space with
him. In short he possessed the power to act.53
As Roach points out, this power also made
the actor physically dangerous to the audi-
ence as well as to himself:
A seventeenth-century physician, steeped in
ageless anxieties of bodily penetration by vapours
from below, could not but notice the unsettling
resemblance between inspiration and disease.54
As a most flexible and trained but at the
same time dangerously uncontrollable actor,
Hanswurst was bound to abuse this power.
His humour, as we have seen, revolved
around gluttony and defecation, sexual acti-
vity, birth and death, emphasized all orifices,
bodily functions and emanations. In this way
his imagination might literally have been
seen as ‘infectious’ and dangerous. 
Such power of the imagination (the Ger-
man word Einbildungskraft literally means
the ‘power to imprint’) can also be seen in
another example from Gottsched’s Bieder-
mann, this time involving Harlekin. Warning
of the dangers of dissimulation at the carni-
val, a correspondent writes:
People go to great effort to disfigure themselves
through ugly masks and are not satisfied with the
face and appearance given to them by nature. . . .
Nobody considers that had he been born this way
he would live as an unhappy monster to the
abhorrence of others. Just recently we had a
memorable example, as a mother who frequented
the carnival every day gave birth to a child in
whose face a mask of flesh had grown and whose
body showed red, yellow, and green patches all
over: for the mother had mostly attended the
carnival in the costume of a Harlequin.55
This example effectively condenses several
contemporary cultural fears into one phobic
image: 1) the fear of maternal imagination,
which was believed to have a direct material
impact on the appearance of the unborn
child;56 2) the fear of uncontrolled artistic
imagination in the shape of the ‘unnatural’
fantasy figure Harlequin; and 3) the fear of
acting as dissimulation, as embodied in the
mask.57 The fear of maternal imagination
especially relates this example to Kristeva’s
theory of abjection, which she links to the
attempt to separate from the maternal body:
The abject confronts us, . . . within our personal
archeology, with our earliest attempts to release the
hold of maternal entity even before ex-isting out-
side of her, thanks to the autonomy of language.58
Yet in the eighteenth century, this rejection of
an osmotic/merging relation with other
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bodies takes the form not so much of a
personal as a cultural form of abjection,
which took place in several different spheres
of society. As Duden has noted with respect
to the medicalization of society in the
eighteenth century, for example, peasants,
the poor and women, who generally held to
the traditional (pre-modern) conceptions of
the body much longer, came to be considered
as having ‘offensive bodies’ by Enlighten-
ment reformers of medicine:
In the final analysis, the Enlightenment reformer
was not concerned with changing behaviour but
with creating a new body. As one country doctor
wrote from the provinces, ‘It would be necessary,
so to speak, to change the nature of the peasant . . .
to make him into an absolutely different kind of
person.
The creation of a new, ‘sealed-off’ body was,
however, not restricted to only one field,
practice, or discipline but has to be viewed in
an interdisciplinary manner. Hanswurst and
Harlequin play pivotal roles in this respect
because they are positioned ‘at the border
between art and life’ and thus cross different
spheres.
In conclusion, we can say that Hans-
wurst’s banishment is clearly multiply over-
determined by several, often seemingly
disparate discourses: Not only is he, as we
have seen, opposed to the ‘civilized’ bour-
geois values Gottsched and the Neubers
want to propagate through model behaviour;
not only does he not adhere to the rules of
reason; and not only is he not a ‘natural’
individual; but he is also representative of an
osmotic body and an osmotic stage. As such
he threatens the spectator with dangerous
physical energies that do not allow for an
aesthetic distance and therefore for the
constitution of the subject in the mirror of the
stage.
Conclusion: Subjection and Abjection
If the new aesthetic relationship of sympa-
thetic identification between spectator and
protagonist in bourgeois tragedy can be
theorized in terms of Lacan’s psychoanalytic
theory of subject formation, as I have argued,
then the early banishment of Hanswurst, as I
hope to have shown, could be theorized in
terms of Kristeva’s theory of abjection.The
abject for Kristeva is defined as whatever is
rejected from the subject’s (or the culture’s)
self-definition with a feeling of disgust. It is
that which does not allow for a recuperation
of the other as an (aesthetic) object: ‘The
abject has only one quality of the object – that
of being opposed to I.’59 Abjection is thus
always a function of the superego: ‘To each
ego its object, to each superego its abject.’60
In the case of Hanswurst, as we have seen, it
was the superego of ‘reason’ that drove him
off the stage. ‘Ich’ could come about in bour-
geois theatre because the censoring ‘Herr Ich’
abjected Hanswurst.
The actual historical form which censor-
ship of the comic figure took in the Enlighten-
ment varied historically and geographically
from institutional marginalization, critical
intervention (Gottsched), or critical silencing
(Lessing), to the (attempted) state censorship
of plays and even gestures. Thus Joseph von
Sonnenfels, the most powerful censor in the
Austrian Enlightenment (which was an
Enlightenment ‘decreed’ by the monarchy
rather than genuinely motivated by a bour-
geois emancipation) demanded in 1770 that
the ‘concept of extemporizing be given its
broadest meaning’, including expecially ‘ges-
tures through which often an itself innocent
speech can become the smuttiest joke’.61
In Catholic southern Germany and Austria,
as I mentioned earlier, the comic figure with
its ‘baroque body’ is much more resilient
than in northern, Protestant areas. This is
probably due to a Catholic sensualism that
was opposed to a Lutheran and Calvinist
rationalism, and favoured the perpetuation
of baroque traditions.62 But here, too, as the
recent work of Beatrix Müller-Kampel has
systematically analyzed, the comic figure
undergoes a gradual taming and civilizing
process which amounts to a kind of self-
censorship of theatre practitioners. 
Stranitzky’s Hanswurst thus eventually
transforms into Johann La Roche’s harmless
Kasperl, who represents a ‘mere diminutive
of the previous Hanswurstian corporeality
[Leiblichkeit]’ and is gradually relegated to
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increasingly minor parts.63 Often the later
forms of Hanswurst or Kasperl themselves
become civilized into figures of identifica-
tion, if not for grown-up audiences then at
least for children. In order to achieve this,
however, anything grotesque, disgusting,
horrible, revolting, loud, and transgressive
about these figures had to be ‘abjected’ in the
process:
If the Hanswurst of the eighteenth century had
screamed, roared, howled, and bawled, Kasperl
now squeaks childishly through the world. The
mountains of sausages and meat that he devoured
have shrunken to a Gugelhupf, and instead of the
barrels of beer, wine, and schnapps he prefers a
glass of milk or lemonade. The streams of sperm,
blood, urine, spit, and vomit have long ceased to
flow, and anything faecal or sexual he does not
even linguistically take in his mouth any more. He
does not fight, clobber, betray, insult, curse, and
mock any more, but, on the contrary shows
children that all this can lead to no good.64
‘And yet,’ as Kristeva says, ‘from its place of
banishment, the abject does not cease chal-
lenging its master.’65 Analogously, as would
have to be shown in detail since it is beyond
the scope of this essay, the grotesque body
and grotesque acting would be rediscovered
in twentieth-century German and Austrian
theatre as a politically powerful tool to dis-
lodge the notion of the autonomous bourgeois
subject – Herr Ich – by theatre practitioners
ranging from Bertolt Brecht and Heiner
Müller to Peter Handke and Elfriede Jelinek. 
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